Orbánization: The Impact of Fidesz on Hungarian Democracy (Part 2)

Image Source: New York Times

Solidifying Power 

With over 2/3rds of the seats in the National Assembly, Fidesz was able to amend the Hungarian constitution without needing backing from any other party. Within a year of the 2010 election, the constitution was amended ten times and then totally overhauled. Many of the changes were immediately red flags. The Constitutional Court was expanded and then packed with Orbán's allies, stripped of several abilities, and made functionally inaccessible to citizens. The power of the Court to review the constitutionality of government actions has been greatly hindered. Hungary was gerrymandered in favor of Fidesz, and the number of parliament seats cut in half. The new Hungarian districts were enshrined in law, requiring a supermajority to be changed (Krugman, 2014).

In addition, the 2011 constitution removed the protected status of hundreds of religious groups, restricting marriage to only be between a man and a woman, and reducing protections of LBGT people and women (Gall, 2013). Later revisions to the constitution served to intensify these issues, essentially banning adoption by gay couples, allowing for the criminalization of homelessness, and mandating that Hungarian children be raised with “values based on our Chrisitan culture” (Dunai, Komuves, 2020). Fidesz has repeatedly targeted subjects which have been points of contention in the constitutional court, making it more difficult for the Court to overturn them. 

Constitutional changes paired with legislature also favored Fidesz electoral success. Many civil servants, including those overseeing elections, were fired and replaced, as well as judges forced into retirement. Those operating Hungarian state broadcasting were replaced, and media coverage quickly began to favor more conservative, nationalist positions. At the same time, Orbán has pressured private media to sell to his corporate allies or to the state. The landscape of how Hungarians get their news has thus been skewed significantly to the right: 90% of all media outlets are owned by the state or a Fidesz ally (Beauchamp, 2018). Orbán has flexed his political power to suppress dissent in the artistic and academic spheres, as well. Perhaps most egregious, in recent elections Fidesz assisted in the founding of multiple fake parties, using signatures from Fidesz supporters and even dead people to get on the ballot. One of the parties was “run” by someone who was homeless. These fake parties split the vote in competitive areas. 

Demand-side factors allowed Fidesz to gain power in 2010; this includes grievances about the economy and the failures of the Socialist-liberal government. However, since then, Fidesz has worked to guarantee electoral success by altering supply-side factors in its favor. As a result, Orbán has been Prime Minister four times in a row, and has been in power for half of Hungary’s existence as a Republic. 2022 saw the party’s strongest showing yet. 

These political manipulations have coincided with Orbán’s tendency towards “crony capitalism”, giving billions of dollars of government contracts to close friends and family’s businesses. The Hungarian political landscape has been continually altered to achieve what Orbán affectionately calls “illiberal democracy”, and others have labeled outright autocracy, or “kleptocracy”, a government whose goal is to steal from citizens. Since 2010, Hungary has been undergoing what many call democratic backsliding, the subject of widespread internal and international criticism. Only 20% of Hungarians feel satisfied with the level of democracy in the county, the third lowest of any EU country (Hobolt, 2012).

The EU implemented article 7 procedures against Hungary for breaching core EU values surrounding the rule of law, an independent judiciary, civil rights, and free and fair elections. The European Parliament also found that Hungary can no longer be classified as a democracy given these changes (European Parliament, 2022). The issue is that there is no formal avenue for the EU to kick Hungary out; when it was first added to the Union, this level of democratic backsliding and disregard for EU laws and norms was not considered as a potential. The political conditionality requirements for being admitted seem to be quickly chipping away. 

The Longevity of Orbánism 

One of the biggest challenges to Hungary is going to be the future fallout from such rapid and intense autocratization. Most significantly, Orbán has failed to appeal to young Hungarians. Many of them were not part of the voting public during the Socialist-Liberal government and therefore do not hold the same resentment against it that Fidesz still relies upon for support. At the same time, this younger generation tends to be more culturally liberal, taking issue with human rights violations and anti-multiculturalism. This is especially true for educated Hungarians, who often seek higher education outside of Hungary and stay abroad after graduation. The threat of “brain drain”, by which a country loses its best intellectual minds, may prove harmful to innovation in the future. In fact, almost half of the young people in the country say that they would like to leave it (European Parliament, 2022).

Aron Weber, a 22 year old from Budapest, has been living in London since he was 16, and has no intention of returning to Hungary permanently. “From when the government came into power in 2010, I was nine, and that means that for the majority of my life, Fidesz was in power. Firstly, this started with the very problematic reform of the education policy with compulsory religious studies classes, which are disgusting and fascist, as well the very intentional rewriting of history books with outright falsities. Life became very unnecessarily politicized, even for a nine year old. I don't want to learn about Jesus and God, and that sex before marriage will kill you. Beyond that, the rising neo-nazi sentiment in Hungary I find very worrying as a Jewish gay man. People get attacked physically for displaying homosexual behavior. As someone who has the resources to leave, I cannot subject myself to that. Because that is just an unsafe decision.”

Weber is a masters student in the Bartlett School of Architecture at University College London. It is difficult to find work in his field in Budapest that does not somehow uphold the current order: “If you view your labor as contributing to an economy and society, I did not want my work and product to contribute to such a system. Large infrastructure projects are usually government-backed, but are used to withdraw money from the European Development Fund. These projects overcharge for certain materials and types of works in ways that are somewhat shady. The possibility of what I am doing is limited to the fact that it may end up being a vehicle for money laundering and things that go against my values.” 

A young generation hoping to abandon the country, combined with policies against immigration, may prove to be unsustainable and harmful to the Hungarian economy, threatening to decrease the size of the workforce to dangerous levels. Fidesz will either address this problem, or risk losing the economic legitimacy which has helped it stay in power. 

“I do not think that Hungary’s fascist history can be undone in my lifetime. In a country that has never shown appreciation towards me and actively discriminates against me, I do not think it is my responsibility to use my skills to support it.”

References

Beauchamp, Zack. “It Happened There: How Democracy Died in Hungary.” Vox. Vox Media, September 13, 2018. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/9/13/17823488/hungary-democracy-authoritarianism-trump.

Dunai, Marton, and Anita Komuves. “Hungary Amends Constitution to Redefine Family, Limits Gay Adoption.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, December 15, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/hungary-lgbt-idUSKBN28P1N8.

Gall, Lydia. “Wrong Direction on Rights.” Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch, March 28, 2023. https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/16/wrong-direction-rights/assessing-impact-hungarys-new-constitution-and-laws.

Hobolt, Sara B. “Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy in the European Union*.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 50 (2012): 88–105. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02229.x.

Krugman, Paul. “Hungary, an Election in Question, Part 2.” The New York Times. The New York Times, February 28, 2014. https://archive.nytimes.com/krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/hungary-an-election-in-question-part-2/.

“MEPs: Hungary Can No Longer Be Considered a Full Democracy.” News: European Parliament . European Parliament , September 15, 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220909IPR40137/meps-hungary-can-no-longer-be-considered-a-full-democracy.