Orbánization: The Impact of Fidesz on Hungarian Democracy (Part 1)

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Once a small liberal-democratic fringe party aiming to represent the interests of young Hungarians, the political party Fidesz and its leader Viktor Orbán, have taken a strong illiberal turn since gaining power. Today the party, which increasingly prioritizes intolerance, authoritarianism, and deception, threatens the sanctity of its country's democratic institutions. As Orbán continues to entrench his position of power at the expense of the public good, young Hungarians are fed up and the future of the country is increasingly bleak. 

Post-Cold War Hungary 

Hungary's economy was heavily dependent on the USSR during the Cold War, leading to inflation peaking around 35% in 1991 (World Bank, 2022). The need for reform was prompted by citizens' increasing awareness of the difference in quality of life between themselves and their Western neighbors. In 1988, the Hungarian government instituted a democracy package, leading to constitutional changes and free elections in 1990. The MDF won the most seats, with Fidesz coming in fifth, led by Orbán as a center-left party. In the 1990s, Hungary saw exploration in identity, economics, and politics, leading to repeated ousting of incumbents. The Socialist Party won the most seats by the next election, leading to a shift to national conservatism for Fidesz. Orbán became Prime Minister in 1998, governing as a conventional conservative. The Socialists regained power in 2002, followed by an enhanced quality of life with investment in infrastructure and technology. Hungary joined the EU in 2004, and the Left coalition maintained their majority in 2006, soon announcing the dissolution of previous standard of living subsidies.

A Scandal on the Left 

In 2006, then Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány made a closed speech to the Socialist Party, harshly and profanely criticizing the government and politicians for misleading the public and failing to enact effective policy during their time in power. He admitted that they had downplayed the scale of efforts needed to enhance Hungary’s economic standing, and that economic elites had taken advantage of public funds to build their own wealth. He showed little interest in listening to the Hungarian public and implied that the government would collaborate with media outlets to soften political blowback. “I almost perished because I had to pretend for 18 months that we were governing. Instead, we lied morning, noon and night,” he said (BBC, 2006). The speech was leaked to a Hungarian radio station, prompting massive protests and sporadic riots in Budapest calling for the PM’s resignation for more than a month. 

Orbán called Gyurcsány a “compulsive liar” (Index, 2006), and the speech tended to strengthen populist claims that the 2002 and 2006 elections were won illegitimately and that media coverage was rigged against the conservatives. 2007 saw increasing inflation, and an effort at widespread restructuring from which unions felt alienated. In 2008, successful referendums by Fidesz over medical and educational funding led to a breakup of the Liberal-socialist coalition. The financial crisis brought about further economic strain (Darvas, 2008). The next year, Gyurcsány resigned. 

Fidesz Back in Power 

Benefitting from public disapproval of the previous government and fractured opposition, Fidesz won a supermajority in the 2010 election. Orbán has been Prime Minister since. His economic approach, nicknamed ‘Orbánomics’, has been a key to his continual electoral success. It generally depends on keeping public spending at a consistently modest level to avoid increasing the deficit. Once in office, he began a wide-reaching work program, employing many citizens, especially in rural areas. Unemployment went down significantly as a result, though about half of that accounts for jobs found outside of Hungary (Kingsley and Novak, 2018). There has also been concern that these programs artificially pushed down unemployment by giving employees meaningless or little work. Still, inflation remained steady as real wages went up alongside foreign direct investment. Hungary’s credit rating improved, and growth multiplied. In the wake of the recession, Fidesz was able to provide a level of stability, and growth for the wealthy, a key to its electoral strategy. 

Orbán has been consistently identified as a populist leader, and his rhetoric reflects this fact. Fidesz argues that it is constantly fighting against elite interests who do not have the best interests of the everyday people in mind, legitimized by the poor standing of the Socialist-Liberals. At the same time, he has exploited Hungary’s cultural homogeneity, taking a strong stance against multiculturalism and immigration and fostering fears of outsiders, who do not belong to the narrowly defined “real people of Hungary”. The message of the harm that immigration can inflict upon the country is present all over - on billboards, on television, even in school textbooks. In a particularly controversial speech, Orbán criticized race-mixing with non-Europeans, which was condemned by a close advisor as “purely Nazi diatribe worthy of Joseph Goebbels” (Waterfield, 2022).

His vitriol towards immigrants is especially targeted at Muslims. 72% of Hungarians have a negative perception of Muslims in their country, compared to an EU-wide 42% (Kreckó, 2019). The EU is thus seen as an enemy which attempts to force immigration and multiculturalism upon Hungary. Globalist elites in Brussels want to push dangerous migrants from the Middle East and Africa into Hungary, threatening their economy, their safety, and their way of life. This is somewhat hypocritical considering that the Hungarian economy is quite economically dependent on the EU, among the top receivers of funds in the Union (Kovacevic, 2019). Orbán succeeds, especially with those in the lower classes, by exploiting fears based on the instability of the past and entrenched biases against those of other cultures. He poses himself as a strongman, who will not allow invaders to “poison” his country. He has gone against EU refugee quotas, built border fences, and pushed out humanitarian groups trying to help migrants. 

References

Darvas, Zsolt. “The Rise and Fall of Hungary.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, October 29, 2008. https://www.theguardian.com/business/blog/2008/oct/29/hungary-imf.

“Europe | Excerpts: Hungarian 'Lies' Speech.” BBC News. BBC, September 19, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5359546.stm.

Index/MTI. “A Fidesz Nem Áll Többé Szóba Gyurcsánnyal.” Index. Index Hungary, April 2, 2009. https://index.hu/belfold/ov0821/.

“Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual %) - Hungary.” World Bank Open Data. World Bank Group, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=HU.

Kingsley, Patrick, and Benjamin Novak. “An Economic Miracle in Hungary, or Just a Mirage?” The New York Times. The New York Times, April 4, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/world/europe/viktor-orban-hungary-economy-election.html.

Kovacevic, Tamara. “EU Budget: Who Pays Most in and Who Gets Most Back?” BBC News. BBC, May 27, 2019. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48256318.

Krekó, Péter, Bulcsú Hunyadi, and Patrik Szicherle. “Anti-Muslim Populism in Hungary: From the Margins to the Mainstream.” Brookings. The Brookings Institution, March 9, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/research/anti-muslim-populism-in-hungary-from-the-margins-to-the-mainstream/.

Waterfield, Bruno. “Viktor Orban's Adviser Accuses Him of 'Pure Nazi Speech Worthy of Goebbels'.” The Times & The Sunday Times. Times Media, July 27, 2022. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/viktor-orbans-adviser-accuses-him-of-pure-nazi-speech-worthy-of-goebbels-5zpp35k8f.