Implications of the Poland Election

Agencja Gazeta/Reuters

On October 15, 2023, Poland held its quadrennial national legislative elections dictating who would control the two Parliamentary houses. The majority coalition would also presumably guide the choice of prime minister. With the rise of populism in Poland, the election had enormous consequences for Poland and the viability of democracy in Europe. 

After the 1989 Revolutions, ending the forty years of Soviet-controlled Communist rule, a wave of democratization spread across Europe. Soon, democracy became the international ideal. However, it was unclear if the newly formed democracies could last. Promoted by globalization, the 2007-2009 financial crash, and the migration crisis of 2015, nationalist regimes in several European states—such as Slovakia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania—are currently usurping power by destroying still-materializing democratic institutions. While democracy currently dominates the globe, in Europe, the emergence of illiberal democracies is creating a cause for concern, challenging the idea that democracy will last as the global standard. 

The first European country to veer to an illiberal democracy was Hungary. Recently, the European Union condemned Hungary, revoking its title of a democracy. In Hungary, Victor Orbán and the Fidesz party have ruled for the past thirteen years, weakening many of the checks and balances in place to ensure fair democratic institutions while  “ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms” (Zakaria 1997, 22). But what really drew Hungary away from democracy was the lack of a voice for opposing opinions (which is essentially dangerous as this populist and nationalist rhetoric is used to disenfranchise minorities, such as immigrants and minority ethnic groups). With control over the media and other means of communication, it is difficult for those trying to resist Fidesz to voice their concerns and for any opposition to overtake the authority of Orbán and his supporters. 

Nearby, Poland is facing concerns similar to those that diverted Hungary away from democracy. In Poland, despite consistent economic growth since 1989, for the past eight years, the Law and Justice (PiS) party has held control of the state through a populist regime that, like other populist parties in Europe, seems to be vying for control of the various branches of government. The results of the legislative elections could be a potential indicator of the future of democracy, in other words signaling if Hungary was an individual case or if it was the start of an ideological shift throughout Europe.

If Poland loses its democratic principles, it creates a pattern in Europe. If other nations see how Hungary and Poland reacted to external issues—enacting nationalist policies in the face of migration and globalization—other countries may follow suit, as they consistently face similar issues to Poland and Hungary. 

Before the election, questions over the possibility of opposition control—ensuring that, at least for now, Poland would remain a democracy—loomed over the results. In the previous legislative election in 2019, PiS secured 43.6 percent of the vote and formed a coalition government led by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. The results were another victory in a series of dominant national elections for the Law and Justice party since 2015. 

The growth of PiS began with a brief stint in power between 2005-2008. PiS took control after the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) “found itself fully discredited by a series of corruption scandals” (Bernard 2021, 600). Without another left-wing party able to gain command, PiS had a way to assert itself as a national party. However, their reign was short-lived as the Civic Platform (PO) took control in 2007 and held that control until 2015. 

Yet, similar to many other European states where populism has emerged, “a substantial part of Polish society is highly traditional and religious, and anxiety over social change can be threatening as economic uncertainty, despite success” (Bernard 2021, 601-602). Thus, when the migration crisis of 2015 occurred, a wave of nationalism allowed the PiS party to once again regain power. 

Subsequently, Andrzej Duda won the 2015 election for the presidency. With his support, party leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski began to use the PiS platform to change the judicial system and media:  “Kaczynski placed loyalists on the constitutional court by being legally dubious and gave political appointees power over the judicial process. His party turned the state broadcast into a tool of government propaganda, used public funds to purchase privately owned regional newspapers and tried to force the owners of independent radio and television stations to sell their rightful possessions” (Petrova & Aydin-Düzgit 2021).

Such maneuvers caused concern that the Law and Justice party was pulling Poland towards an illiberal democracy. Nevertheless, Kaczynski and his party have “retained many features of a functioning democracy” (Higgins 2023). Despite a desire for immense power, as long as PiS keeps democratic functions in place, there is still an opportunity for opposition, and thus, Poland will remain a legitimate democracy. 

This opportunity for opposition manifested two weeks before the Polish election, when a large protest occurred in Warsaw against the current government, calling for a national change in the upcoming legislative elections. Depending on the source, between 100,000 and one million people attended these peaceful protests without PiS suppressing the opposition rally (Cienski 2023). It was unclear, however, if this opposing voice would be heard in the election results. 

Nonetheless, with the highest turnout in the country’s history—77.4 percent of the national population—PiS gained the largest share of the vote of any party, at 35.4 percent. Despite that “the party that wins the most votes customarily gets the right to try to put together a government”, the opposition coalition (the Civic Coalition, made up of three parties) gained a majority of the vote share at 53.7 percent, rendering PiS’ chances of forming a coalition government unlikely (Petrova & Aydin-Düzgit 2021).

Jaroslaw Kaczynski, though, is not giving up on retaining power. Before the election, he declared that regardless of “what the final distribution of votes will be—we will win” (Higgins 2023). Adding to the lack of celebration, PiS President Duda is the one charged with making the ultimate decision on approving the coalition and electing the prime minister.

Assuming President Duda elects a leader fairly, it is likely a Civil Coalition leader will be issued into office. However, as Kaczynski alluded to, PiS is still not ready to step down. President Duda has called for the new parliament to meet on November 13th, the last possible day he could do so. By delaying the process, the new government may not convene until mid-December. In the meantime, PiS will most likely explore any possible avenue to maintain political control. 

If the PiS party does not peacefully give power back to the Civil Coalition (and presumably to former Prime Minister Donald Tusk), the future of democracy in Poland looks grim. The rise of populism and illiberal democracy may not just be a concern in Poland, but across the rest of Europe, forcing a globalized Europe to rethink how to protect democracy. 

Nevertheless, the results of the election are promising for Poland and Europe: the Polish election demonstrated that opposing voices still have a say in the voting process and that populism may only be a transitional phase. Still, one must monitor the response of the Law and Justice Party over the next couple of months to draw any concrete conclusions about the future of democracy in Poland and how it impacts the rest of Europe. 

References

Bernhard, Michael. 2021. “Democratic Backsliding in Poland and Hungary.” Slavic Review 80, no. 3 (Fall 2021): 585-607. https://doi.org/10.1017/slr.2021.145.

Cienski, Jan. 2023. “Huge but glum: Poland’s opposition puts a million people on the streets.” Politico, October 1, 2023.  https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-tusk-million-hearts-civic-coalition-warsaw/

Higgins, Andrew. 2023. “With Opposition Gains, Poland Looks to Unwind an ‘Illiberal Democracy.’” New York Times, October 16, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/16/world/europe/poland-vote.html.

Petrova, Tsveta & Aydin-Düzgit, Senem. 2021. “Democracy Support Without Democracy: The Cases of Poland and Turkey.”  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 5, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/05/democracy-support-without-democracy-cases-of-poland-and-turkey-pub-83485. 

Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (1997): 22–43. https://doi.org/10.2307/20048274.