The Coup in Myanmar
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February 1, 2021 marked the downfall of any democratic progress in Myanmar. The previously ruling military seized control of the country, arresting State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, handing power to Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander in Chief of the military. Mass protests at this subversion of democratic progress have been met with violent tactics, including use of water cannons, rubber bullets and live ammunition, resulting in the deaths of many civilians (Cuddy, 2021). While in and of itself somewhat of an illusion, hopes of democratic progress have been dashed in Myanmar, illustrating yet another example of democratic backsliding and the growth of authoritarianism worldwide.
Since its independence in 1948, Myanmar has been predominantly ruled by the military, which held power between 1962 and 2011. Aung San Suu Kyi, the predominant political figure prior to the coup and the daughter of General Aung San, a hero of Myanmar’s independence movement, sought to establish democracy in the 1990s. Her efforts resulted in 15 years spent under house arrest between 1989 and 2010 (Goldman, 2021) (Cuddy, 2021). Ultimately, the military junta accepted democratizing reforms in 2011, enabling parliamentary elections, albeit maintaining significant military autonomy and privilege, as the military was guaranteed 25% of the seats in Parliament and were tasked with selecting three cabinet members responsible for management of the police and border security. Aung Hlain personally oversaw these privileges, while additionally controlling two substantial conglomerates (Goldman 2021). Throughout its history since independence, the military has been a pivotal and influential force in Myanmar’s politics.
The military, dominated by the majority Bamar ethnic group, has a history of violence, particularly towards ethnic minorities. This violence typically has been most concentrated in regions in which ethnic minorities make up a greater percentage of the population. Previous accounts of the widespread rape of women and girls, as well as the use of citizens to perform dangerous tasks for the military, including use as “human land mine detectors” according to Thein Aung, a victim of military violence, have been documented (Paddock, 2021). Perhaps the most striking, as well as the most recent example of military violence towards minorities can be observed in the genocide of the Rohingya in 2017, a minority Muslim group in the Rakhine state, in which an estimated 700,000 refugees were forced to flee to neighboring Bangladesh (Cuddy, 2021).
While democratically elected, the government under Suu Kyi in conjunction with significant military power created an atmosphere in which true democracy was far from the norm. In the first contested election in 25 years, Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party won a convincing victory in the 2015 elections (Goldman 2021). Similarly to the military, Suu Kyi’s government has a record of marginalization of minorities, with measures such as voting restrictions to further benefit the NLD, as many ethnic minorities within Myanmar tend to support local parties representing their interests. Her nationalistic policies can also be evidenced in her treatment of the Rohingya, in which she deemed the Rohingya a foreign people and a threat towards the Buddhist majority. She further called off a ceasefire between the military and the Rohingya and did little to promote elections in Rakhine, preventing political representation for the Rohingya (Fisher, 2021). Suu Kyi’s efforts to consolidate power in the somewhat illusory democracy in Myanmar spurred the military to take action through a coup.
Suu Kyi’s sidelining of the military and rivals from the previous military administration soured relations between her government and the military, allowing the military to take advantage of their power and influence to conduct a coup. Upon ascending to power, Suu Kyi was quick to purge political rivals from the old government as well as political rivals within her party. More recently, she further sought to do away with the seats guaranteed to the military in Parliament. The coup was further encouraged by the approaching mandatory retirement age for Aung Hlaing (Fisher, 2021). While her ambition to end the guarantee of Parliamentary seats to the military would have succeeded in curbing the military’s power and democratizing the country, the power and influence of the military allowed for the coup to be carried out against a leader who clearly had ambitions of weakening the military, whether to consolidate her own power or to liberalize the country. The NLD’s landslide victory on November 8, 2020, winning 83% of the vote while defeating parties including the military proxy party, propelled Aung Hlaing and the military to take action to maintain their power (Goldman, 2021) (Fisher, 2021).
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the military was quick to attempt to justify its actions, claiming widespread voter fraud despite no evidence. The military additionally declared its intentions to hold a revote. Aung Hlaing declared a one year state of emergency, likely to provide ample time to eliminate dissent. Suu Kyi and Win Myint are currently both being held in undisclosed locations, facing six and three years in prison, respectively. Suu Kyi is charged with illegally possessing foreign equipment in the form of walkie talkies reportedly found in her home as well as violating COVID restrictions through interacting with a crowd. Win Myint faces similar charges of violating COVID restrictions. The legitimacy of their trials, however, is already in question as Suu Kyi has been denied legal representation and her lawyer was not informed that her trial had begun (Goldman, 2021). All evidence points towards a power grab by the military to do away with a leader intent on curbing their power rather than a coup to remove a despot and hold a fair election, as the military claims.
Following the coup, there has been a steady uptick in violence towards protestors. Initially, telephone and internet access were suspended in an attempt to dash communications and streamline the authoritarian power grab. As protests grew, two protestors were killed on February 20, including one minor. This in turn sparked greater protests, including a national boycott just two days later. By early March, at least sixty civilians had been murdered by the military while protesting, including thirty eight on March 3 alone. Violence has spread to the countryside as well as the city, with eight killed and twenty in the village of Myaing on March 11 and three killed and a whopping fifty injured in the village of Dawei (Goldman, 2021). In perhaps an even more striking increase, at least 715 protesters have been killed as of mid-April.
Internationally, the coup has prompted sanctions from the West, but a far more neutral response from Myanmar’s neighbors. The EU, US and UK announced sanctions against the military and military-led conglomerates (Goldman, 2021). Thailand, Cambodia and the Philippines have essentially taken a neutral stance on the coup (Bangkok Post, 2021). China, which has heavily invested in Myanmar, has notably taken a neutral stance on the coup, perhaps in an attempt to protect its investments in the country (Sullivan, 2021). Historically, China has maintained steady ties with both Suu Kyi’s administration and the military despite some military suspicion of China (Goldman, 2021) (Fisher, 2021). The lack of unanimity in condemnation of the coup and the neutral stances of Myanmar’s neighbors, particularly China, a significant trading partner, will likely allow military control in Myanmar to continue.
Myanmar’s turn towards authoritarianism, while unique in many respects due to its history of a powerful and influential military, remains part of a concerning worldwide trend of democratic backsliding. While a coup may be a dramatic example, recent legislation limiting voting rights in the U.S. as well as former President Donald Trump’s attempts to delegitimize the media can certainly serve as examples of democratic backsliding. Additional examples worldwide include crackdowns on the judiciary and media in countries including Turkey, Hungary and Poland, persecution of the Uighur minority in China and the attempted assassination and subsequent imprisonment of Russian opposition leader Alexei Nalvalny (Bermeo, 2016) (Petrequin, 2020). Myanmar is a microcosm of the trend of democratic backsliding and highlights the necessity of democracies standing together to denounce authoritarian moves such as the coup. Furthermore, the coup emphasizes the need for democracies to stand together to apply measures such as sanctions to put pressure on authoritarian regimes to combat the trend of authoritarianism and to advance human rights worldwide.
References
Bermeo, Nancy. “On Democratic Backsliding.” Johns Hopkins University Press, vol. 27, no. 1, Jan. 2016, muse.jhu.edu/article/607612.
Cuddy, Alice. “Myanmar Coup: What Is Happening and Why?” BBC News, BBC, 1 Apr. 2021, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55902070.
Fisher, Max. “How a Deadly Power Game Undid Myanmar's Democratic Hopes.” New York Times, 2 Feb. 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/02/02/world/asia/myanmar-coup-aung-san-suu-kyi.html?name=styln-myanmar®ion=TOP_BANNER&block=storyline_menu_recirc&action=click&pgtype=Article&impression_id=&variant=show.
Goldman, Russell. “Myanmar's Coup and Violence, Explained.” New York Times, 12 Apr. 2021, www.nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-coup.html.
Paddock, Richard C. “'It's Better to Walk Through a Minefield': Victims of Myanmar's Army Speak.” New York Times, 9 Mar. 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/03/09/world/asia/myanmar-military-tatmadaw-violence.html?name=styln-myanmar®ion=TOP_BANNER&block=storyline_menu_recirc&action=click&pgtype=Article&impression_id=&variant=show.
Petrequin, Samuel. “European Report Finds Waning of Democracy in Poland, Hungary.” AP NEWS, Associated Press, 30 Sept. 2020, apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-checks-and-balances-poland-hungary-europe-e3bca7b1fcae74f071eb585cb03d0db5.
Sullivan, Michael. “China's Relationship With Myanmar's Military: It's Complicated.” NPR, NPR, 29 Mar. 2021, www.npr.org/2021/03/29/982417602/protestors-in-myanmar-have-torched-several-chinese-owned-or-operated-factories.
“West Condemns Myanmar Coup but Thailand, Cambodia Shrug.” Bangkok Post, 1 Feb. 2021, www.bangkokpost.com/world/2060651/west-condemns-myanmar-coup-but-thailand-cambodia-shrug.