It is widely agreed upon that Russia, in partnership with Iran, tipped the balance of the Syrian civil war in favor of the Assad regime. Although coming short of total victory, Russia’s support in particular was instrumental in salvaging a militarily dire situation for the regime. With tens of thousands of personnel and mercenaries having rotated through Syria since 2015, understanding Russia’s rationale for intervention may provide a glimpse into the Kremlin’s way of thinking. 

The Russian understanding of the Syrian conflict—as well as the Arab Spring as a whole—stands in complete opposition to the commonly understood narrative. Rather than the region-wide unrest being a product of spontaneous, organic discontent, the Kremlin believes the protests to be products of Western machinations. This way of thinking also applied to the color revolutions in post-Soviet Eurasia and the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution in particular. In the Kremlin’s eyes, these uprisings are at the very least encouraged by the United States and its allies in order to bring about regime change and facilitate the emergence of Western-backed governments—with Russia being the final target. In the context of the Middle East, Russia has certain security concerns. It opposed the NATO intervention in Libya, and has repeatedly criticized the handling of the postwar situation, which had provided fertile ground for militant groups to take root. In fearing the contagion of democratic revolution and to a lesser extent militant islamism, Russia has therefore styled itself as the leading proponent of counterrevolution in Eurasia and the Arab World. 

Russia formally intervened in the Syrian conflict in 2015. By then, the Assad regime, though holding onto Syria’s key cities, had lost the vast majority of the country to opposition forces, as well as the Islamic State. Russia intervened on the basis of combating the Islamic State, deploying a sizable contingent of aircraft, naval vessels, and military personnel to the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia’s true intentions were made clear in its first airstrike when it targeted Syrian opposition forces rather than the Islamic State. In the course of its campaign, Russia did indeed engage with the Islamic State, but without consistency, as it soon became clear that Moscow’s primary objective was destroying the Syrian opposition—Assad’s most serious adversary—rather than fighting militants. 

Seven years later, it can be said that Russia has succeeded in its intervention. On an operational level, the intervention proved to be a low-cost affair, as Russia focused on waging an air campaign, while Iran and its proxies took on the heavy burden of ground engagements. Russia used its ground troops sparingly, deploying its special forces in limited capacities, while relying for the most part on the state-backed PMC ‘Wagner’ for patrols and tactical engagements. Relying on mercenaries lowered the stakes, so when Russia did suffer casualties—like in an accidental engagement with US forces in 2018—the Kremlin did not face political repercussions. Russia even attempted to rebuild the Syrian army—which had degraded into a clutter of militias—providing hardware, training, and advice for key units like the Special Forces and the Republican Guard, while restructuring the organization of the army as a whole. The result has been that the Syrian Regime, under the guidance of its patrons, has managed to rout the opposition, and re-conquer large swathes of the country., 

In undertaking this intervention, Russia has not only acted as a counterrevolutionary force, but has also attained concrete strategic gains. Since 1967, Russia has been leased the Tartus naval facility on the Eastern Mediterranean, and its support for the Syrian regime has led to a renewal of the lease, which will last until the late 2040s. Russia has been allowed to upgrade the facility and utilize it as a base of operations in the Eastern Mediterranean—such as its 2017 intervention in Libya. Its indefinite military presence in Syria potentially allows for further power projection into the Levant, Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa, while also making its consent integral in any future political settlement. 

Despite lacking the qualifications of a great power, Russia's uncompromising stance in this conflict has allowed it to pose as one, with states in the Middle East now accepting Moscow as a key player in the region. Russian arms sales have increased (at least prior to the conflict in Ukraine), while Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have all sought closer strategic ties with Moscow. Russia’s newfound standing in the region has been demonstrated in OPEC’s refusal to increase crude oil production—in spite of American insistence. Indeed, while Western leaders have given Putin a cold shoulder, UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed went as far to pay a state visit to Russia in mid-October. 

Russia’s long term goal for Syria may be to turn it into an Arab Belarus—a state wholly reliant on Moscow for strategic and economic direction. Although it has found a pliable client in Bashar al-Assad, Iran also has its own designs on Syria, and may have mutually exclusive goals to the Kremlin. If the situation in Ukraine continues to grow more dire for Russia, it may be forced to divert some resources from Syria, thereby opening the door for greater Iranian influence. 

References

1.  Jaffery, Minna. “Understanding the Russian Position in Syria - New Lines Institute.” New Lines Institute - New Lines Institute Is the First Independent, Non-Partisan American Think Tank, Newlines Institute, 3 Mar. 2021, https://newlinesinstitute.org/russia/understanding-the-russian-position-in-syria-2/. 

2.  CaspianReport, director. YouTube, YouTube, 12 Oct. 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=idHQIMrtB2M. Accessed 2 Dec. 2022. 

3.  Borshchevskaya, Anna. “Russia's Strategic Success in Syria and the Future of Moscow's Middle East Policy.” Lawfare, Brooking Institute, 23 Jan. 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/russias-strategic-success-syria-and-future-moscows-middle-east-policy. 

4.  Venneri, Maryna, et al. “Russia's Failed Efforts to Restructure the Syrian Army.” Middle East Institute, 22 Nov. 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/russias-failed-efforts-restructure-syrian-army.