The Case Against Legislative Term Limits

In a 60 Minutes interview a few days after his upset victory, President-elect Donald Trump threw out a haphazard endorsement of congressional term limits, a policy he failed to pursue during his first term (Stahl). Republicans had pushed for term limits in their “Contract with America” in the 1994 midterms, but interest in the policy faded by the end of the 90s. Though a revival movement appears unlikely, 80% of Americans, including 87% of Republicans and 73% of Democrats, still support a constitutional amendment to enact term limits on federal legislators (McLaughlin and Associates). Despite their populist appeal, however, legislative term limits have failed when enacted at the state level and would only make congress less functional if enacted federally.

To many, the longevity of prominent yet unpopular politicians proves that term limits are necessary. The Speaker of the House, both majority leaders, both majority whips and the Senate minority leader are over 70 years old; at the beginning of the 117th Congress, the average number of terms served by a member of the House was 4.5 (8.9 years). Both Rep. Pelosi and Sen. McConnell, both of whom have served since the mid-80s, are extraordinarily unpopular, at -19.4 and -33.5 points respectively (RealClearPolitics). Critics claim that their continued power demonstrates that there exist insurmountable barriers to unseating incumbents—and incumbency does have its advantages. Incumbents receive higher levels of institutional support from friendly special interests, have higher name recognition, and receive the franking privilege, the ability to send mail to their constituents for free. However, though these advantages may have been more significant in decades prior, a FiveThirtyEight analysis of the 2018 elections found that the incumbency bonus has shriveled to fewer than three points, hardly a bulletproof lead (Rakich).

Additionally, focusing on the national popularity of Congressional leaders is misleading. The United States does not elect its legislators nationally, and both McConnell and Pelosi continue to easily win their primaries and reelection campaigns—Pelosi defeated her Democratic general election challenger by more than 55 points. Local voters have recognized that, despite taking flack in the media, current House and Senate leadership have been effective in managing their caucuses and fighting for their priorities with the slim majorities each side has had for the past decades, and they have no wish to replace them. Fundamentally, term limits make the antidemocratic assumption that voters cannot be trusted to make decisions on their own. 

Some argue that term limits would entirely eliminate seniority-based Congressional leadership and allow for congresspeople to vote more independently. Even assuming that weaker parties would improve the legislature (they would not), if fundraising continued to play a large role in campaigns, power would simply be consolidated in the RNC and DNC. Better to have geriatric but accountable leadership than an increase in the power of the donor class.

Despite their flaws, term limits really are popular—and have been enacted in 15 states. Though ostensibly one of the bluest states in the nation, California has a long history of enacting half-baked, populist ideas at the ballot box. Prop 140 may have not been quite as damaging as Prop 13 or Prop 8, but its results demonstrate some of the problems term limits can cause. The proposition limited state senators to two four-year terms (eight years total) and assemblymembers to three two-year terms (six years total). A report from the Public Policy Institute of California, published 14 years after the passage of Prop 140 but before it was amended in 2012, analyzed its effects (Cain and Kousser). Overall, they were relatively minimal; however, the capacity of the legislature did noticeably decline. The authors found that the legislature became less likely to amend the Governor’s Budget, and that oversight of the executive branch had declined significantly. They also found that frequent changes in the membership and leadership of committees diminished their policy expertise, worsening legislation, and that the legislature’s research capacity also declined, with a large turnover in staffers occurring immediately after the passage of Prop 140. Term limits did accelerate the diversification of the legislature by increasing turnover—however, this likely would have occurred regardless, if more slowly, without term limits.

The National Conference of State Legislatures report “Coping with Term Limits” found more significant harms nationally (Bowser et al.). Term-limited legislatures experienced decreases in civility and compromise, especially across the aisle. In addition, the NCSL report found that the competency of lawmakers decreased, as institutional knowledge was wiped away each election cycle. Newly elected legislators had no senior colleagues to assist them, which “forces term-limited legislators to rely on lobbyists for information.” At the same time, lobbyists, whose access to power is dependent on their reputations, became less accountable. Politicians who had been misled by bad actors were termed out permanently, while lobbyists only needed to sit out until the memory of their misdeeds had been erased. Term limits also reduce accountability for long-run effects of policy, as well as enabling legislators to act without accountability during their lame duck terms.

The electoral system in the United States is far from perfect, but term limits would worsen, not improve, American politics. There are a multitude of democratic reforms, such as proportional representation and approval voting, that would go further to align the interests of voters with those of politicians. Ultimately, the idea of an expansion of term limits should fade with the Trump presidency.

Sources:

Bowser, Jennifer Drage, et al. “Coping with Term Limits.” www.ncsl.org, National Conference of State Legislatures, Aug. 2006, https://house.louisiana.gov/H_Reps/TermsCmteDocs/NCSL-term%20limits%20final.pdf.

Cain, Bruce E., and Thad Kousser. “Research Brief - Public Policy Institute of California.” Public Policy Institute of California, 2004, https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/content/pubs/rb/RB_1104BCRB.pdf.

McLaughlin and Associates. “National Poll 2021 - U.S. Term Limits.” TermLimits.com, 1 Mar. 2021, https://www.termlimits.com/library/National_Poll_2021-OF.pdf.

Millhiser, Ian. “The Single Worst Idea Proposed at the Democratic Debate.” Vox, Vox, 21 Nov. 2019, https://www.vox.com/2019/11/20/20975359/worst-idea-democratic-debate-tom-steyer-term-limits.

Rakich, Nathaniel. “How Much Was Incumbency Worth in 2018?” FiveThirtyEight, FiveThirtyEight, 6 Dec. 2018, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-much-was-incumbency-worth-in-2018/. 

RealClearPolitics. “McConnell Favorability Ratings.” RealClearPolitics, 5 Apr. 2022, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/mitch_mcconnell_favorableunfavorable-6672.html#!

RealClearPolitics. “Pelosi Favorability Ratings.” RealClearPolitics, 5 Apr. 2022, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/nancy_pelosi_favorableunfavorable-6673.html#!

Stahl, Lesley. “President-Elect Trump Speaks to a Divided Country.” CBS News, CBS Interactive, 13 Nov. 2016, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-donald-trump-family-melania-ivanka-lesley-stahl/.